Patient Cost-Sharing, Hospitalization Offsets, and the Design of Optimal Health Insurance for the Elderly by Amitabh Chandra et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
PATIENT COST-SHARING, HOSPITALIZATION OFFSETS, AND THE DESIGN










We thank, without implicating, Kathy Donneson and Terrence Newsome from CalPERS for invaluable
technical assistance, Dan Gottlieb and Weiping Zhou at Dartmouth Medical School for assistance
with the Medicare data, Drs. Dhruv Bansal, Phoutie Bansal, Julie Bynum, Amy Richardson, and Ivy
Tiu for assisting with the classification of prescription drugs, James deBenedetti, Michele Douglas,
Will Manning, Doug Miller, April Omoto, Doug Staiger, and seminar participants at the Annual Health
Economics Conference, the NBER, UC-Davis, and the Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy Council
for helpful comments. Gruber acknowledges support from the Kaiser Family Foundation and the National
Institute on Aging, and Chandra from NIA P01 AG19783-02, an NBER Aging Fellowship, and the
Nelson Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Gruber, and Robin McKnight. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Patient Cost-Sharing, Hospitalization Offsets, and the Design of Optimal Health Insurance
for the Elderly
Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Gruber, and Robin McKnight
NBER Working Paper No. 12972
March 2007, Revised June 2009
JEL No. I1
ABSTRACT
Patient cost-sharing for primary care and prescription drugs is designed to reduce the prevalence of
moral hazard in medical utilization. Yet the success of this strategy depends on two factors: the elasticity
of demand for those medical goods, and the risk of downstream hospitalizations by reducing access
to beneficial health care. Surprisingly, we know little about either of these factors for the elderly, the
most intensive consumers of health care in our country. We remedy both of these deficiencies by studying
a policy change that raised patient cost-sharing for retired public employees in California. We find
that physician office visits and prescription drug utilization are price sensitive, with implied arc-elasticities
that are similar to those of the famous RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). However, unlike
the HIE, we find substantial “offset” effects in terms of increased hospital utilization in response to
the combination of higher copayments for physicians and prescription drugs. These offset effects are
concentrated in patients for whom medical care is presumably efficacious: those with a chronic disease.
Finally, we find that the savings from increased cost-sharing accrue mostly to the supplemental insurer,
while the costs of increased hospitalization accrue mostly to Medicare; thus, there is a fiscal externality
associated with cost-sharing increases by supplemental insurers. Our findings suggest that health insurance
should be tied to underlying health status, with chronically ill patients facing lower cost-sharing. We
also conclude that the externalities to Medicare from supplemental insurance coverage may be more
modest than previously suggested due to these offsets.
Amitabh Chandra





















  The elderly are the most intensive consumers of health care in the United States today.  
Individuals over age 65 consume 36% of health care in the U.S., despite representing only 13% of 
the population (CMS, 2005).  The Medicare program that insures the nation’s elderly (as well as the 
disabled) is the third largest expenditure item for the Federal government, and is projected to 
exceed Social Security by 2024 (Board of Trustees, 2005).  This rapid growth in program 
expenditures was reinforced by the recent introduction of Medicare Part D, a new plan providing 
coverage for the outpatient prescription drugs used by Medicare beneficiaries.  
  The Federal government has undertaken a variety of strategies to control Medicare program 
growth on the supply side, from the introduction of prospective reimbursement for hospitals to 
reductions in provider reimbursement rates.  Yet Medicare spending growth has continued 
unabated.  Recently, therefore, there has been a growing interest in demand-side approaches to 
controlling system costs, through higher patient costs which would induce more price sensitivity in 
medical spending. 
  Using demand-side approaches to constrain the growth of Medicare spending is hampered 
by three difficulties. First, surprisingly, we have no evidence on the price sensitivity of the elderly 
to point-of-service medical costs.  For the non-elderly, the question of the sensitivity of medical 
consumption to its price was addressed by the famous RAND Health Insurance Experiment, one of 
the most important pieces of social policy research of the post-war period.  The RAND HIE 
randomized individuals across health insurance plans of differing generosity with respect to patient 
costs, and the results showed that higher patient payments significantly reduced medical care 
utilization, without any adverse health outcomes on average (Manning et al. (1987), Newhouse 
(1993)).  While this evidence is now almost thirty years old, it has remained the “gold standard” for  
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evaluating the impact of patient-side cost-sharing and the design of insurance benefits.   
  However, the HIE estimates the elasticity of demand in a fee-for-service environment that 
may exhibit very different responsiveness to prices than the world of managed care.   Moreover, 
changes in the practice of medicine, including the increased use of prescription drugs, the growth of 
imaging and diagnostic technology and the development of minimally invasive surgery, may imply 
a structural change in the elasticity of medical demand and the health impacts of any utilization 
reductions.  Finally, even absent other changes, it is unclear whether the results of the HIE apply to 
the elderly population that was not included in this social experiment. 
  Second, there may be particular concern that increased cost-sharing for the elderly can cause 
offsetting rises in medical costs elsewhere in the system.  The HIE did test this “offset effect” for 
the non-elderly, and found no evidence, for example, that higher outpatient cost-sharing led to more 
use of inpatient services.  Recent research on prescription drug utilization by the non-elderly, 
however, has shown that higher copayments lead to lower utilization of maintenance drugs for 
chronic illness, which implies (although it has yet to be proved) that an offset effect may exist 
(Goldman et al., 2006).  Once again, this is a major concern for the elderly who are the most 
intensive users of expensive medical services. 
  A final complication is the fact that Medicare already has quite substantial cost-sharing 
requirements, with an uncapped 20% coinsurance rate for physician services and a high deductible 
for hospital utilization.  As a result, most enrollees have some form of supplemental coverage for 
their medical spending, either provided by an employer, purchased on their own, or provided 
through state Medicaid programs.  Thus, introducing demand-side price sensitivity requires 
involving these supplemental insurers who control the first-dollar exposure of the elderly to medical  
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costs.  This can be difficult because the interests of the first-dollar insurer and the last-dollar insurer 
may not be readily aligned.  In particular, there are long-standing concerns about the fiscal 
externality on Medicare from supplemental coverage; by providing first-dollar coverage, these 
policies increase utilization, raising the costs to Medicare.   In this paper, we provide new evidence 
on all three of these issues by studying a major set of copayment changes in a modern, managed 
care environment.  Facing mounting fiscal pressure from health plan cost increases, the California 
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) Board, the third largest purchaser of health 
insurance in the United States, enacted a series of substantial copayment increases in February 
2001.  For the remainder of 2001, copayments were increased for the Preferred Provider 
Organizations (PPOs) that were offered by the state to its employees.  Then, beginning in 2002, 
copayments were increased for the remaining enrollees in Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs) operating under contract to CalPERS.  Importantly, these changes occurred not just for 
active employees, but for retirees receiving supplemental insurance through the plans as well.  The 
result was a staggered set of copayment changes that allow us to carefully evaluate their impact on 
the medical care utilization of the elderly.
1 
  To evaluate these policy changes, we have compiled (with the assistance of CalPERS) a 
comprehensive database of all medical utilization data
2 for those enrolled continuously in several of 
the CalPERS plans from January, 2000 through September, 2003.  This database has information on 
every medical contact, allowing us to comprehensively study the effect of these copayment policy 
changes on a wide variety of medical utilization outcomes. 
  We have a number of interesting findings.  First, we find that both physician office visits 
                                                 
1 We can, of course, also study utilization of the non-elderly, but this is of less interest because of existing studies.  We intend to 
investigate responses among the non-elderly in future work.  
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and prescription drug utilization are modestly price sensitive among the elderly, with implied arc-
elasticities that are similar to those found in the HIE for the non-elderly.  Second, unlike the HIE, 
we find significant “offset” effects in terms of increased hospital utilization in response to the 
combination of higher copayments for physicians and prescription drugs.  These offset effects are 
concentrated, however, in the most ill populations, particularly those who had a chronic illness or 
who had high previous medical spending.  Finally, we find that the savings from increased cost-
sharing accrue mostly to the supplemental insurer, CalPERS, while the costs of increased 
hospitalization accrue mostly to Medicare. As a result, when supplemental insurance cost-sharing 
rises, the net fiscal benefits for Medicare are much smaller than previously recognized. 
  Our paper proceeds as follows.  Part I provides some background on previous work in this 
area and on the policy change we are studying.  Part II describes the data and empirical strategy.  
Part III presents our basic set of results on price sensitivity.  Part IV then extends the results in a 
variety of directions.  Part V concludes. 
 
Part I: Background 
Previous Work on Price Sensitivity of Medical Demand 
  The previous literature on the impact of copayment changes can be broken down into three 
“eras”.  The first is the work on elasticities of demand that pre-dated the RAND HIE.  Most of this 
work simply regressed medical care spending on the level of coinsurance, either at the family or the 
state level (e.g. Feldstein, 1971; Rosett and Huang, 1973).  This work faced the fundamental 
problem that the level of coinsurance is a function both of choice of insurance plan and of previous 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2 All claims information used was de-identified prior to receipt for both CalPERS and study researchers.  
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medical spending (since the level of coinsurance varies by whether individuals are below or above 
the deductible level, for example), and both of these are quite likely to be correlated with 
contemporaneous medical spending.  One of the earliest studies to use quasi-experimental variation 
was Phelps and Newhouse (1972). This study examined the impact of a change in cost-sharing in 
the Stanford medical plan, but had no control group to capture general time trends in demand that 
might confound their analysis. 
  The second era is the RAND HIE, which is summarized in Manning et al. (1987) and 
Newhouse (1993).  In the wake of the unconvincing evidence from the first era of the literature, the 
government, in the mid-1970s, funded a massive social experiment to evaluate the impact of cost-
sharing on demand.  Families who enrolled in the HIE were randomly assigned to plans with widely 
varying coinsurance and deductible amounts.  This random assignment guaranteed that the results 
could be used to cleanly infer the impacts of varying coinsurance rates on demand.  The HIE 
showed that medical services were modestly price responsive, with an overall estimated arc-
elasticity of medical spending in the range of -0.2.   
  There were a variety of other important findings that are summarized in Newhouse (1993), 
but three stand out for our purposes.  First, the reduction in medical utilization was relatively 
uniform: for almost every category of care, utilization fell for both (in theory) “effective” and 
“ineffective” care.  Second, despite the reduced medical care that resulted from high patient 
coinsurance, those in high coinsurance plans were in no worse health, on average.  Even among 
subgroups such as the poor or the unhealthy, there was no systematic relationship between patient 
coinsurance and health.  There is one exception that has received much attention: the study found 
sizeable advantages of free care for the share of the sample that was both low income (bottom 20%  
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of the income distribution) and chronically ill (least healthy 25% of the sample).  In particular, such 
individuals saw large declines in their blood pressure on the free care plan relative to the 
coinsurance plans; improvements in respiratory functioning; and improvements in vision and dental 
health.
3  Finally, the study found no “offset effects”: there was no evidence that high coinsurance, 
by causing individuals to forgo efficacious preventive care, would raise costs through inappropriate 
care later on (particularly at the hospital).  On the experimental plan with higher outpatient 
coinsurance, but no inpatient charges, hospital utilization actually fell rather than rose.  
  The third era includes studies subsequent to the HIE: Cherkin, Grothaus and Wagner (1989) 
studied the introduction of a $5 copayment rate for state employees enrolled in an HMO in 
Washington state, in the mid-1980s, relative to federal employees.  They find a sizeable reduction 
in office visits.  Selby, Fireman and Swain (1996), examined the introduction of an emergency 
room copayment for some firms insured by the Kaiser Permanente HMO plan in the early 1990s, 
relative to a control group of those firms who did not see this copayment increase.  They find a 
significant decline in emergency room utilization, with no evidence of adverse impacts on health.  
Eichner (1996) studied the impact on utilization in a fee-for-service plan, using the fact that adults 
in a family face different prices as injuries to their children push them above out-of-pocket cost 
sharing limits, and he finds an elasticity of spending of -0.3 to -0.4.   
  There is also a recent and sizeable literature that focuses on the price elasticity of demand 
for prescription drugs.  Studies such as those by Goldman et al. (2004),  Landsman et al. (2005) and 
Gaynor, Li and Vogt (2007) find that prescription drug use is price sensitive, with low elasticities of 
                                                 
3 While this potential caveat has garnered much attention, however, it is important to recognize its limitations.  First, none of the 
estimated effects on the health of this group are statistically significant in a traditional sense; the samples are simply too small to 
have much confidence in these results.  Second, as Newhouse (1993) emphasizes, there is no evidence of overall health benefits for  
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around -0.1 for drugs used to maintain chronic conditions (such as ACE inhibitors or statins), but 
much higher elasticities of around -0.3 to -0.4 for drugs used for acute conditions (such as Cox-2 
inhibitors for pain management).  
  These studies have two important limitations.  First, they are exclusively focused on the 
non-elderly, ignoring the elderly patients who are responsible for a massive, and growing, share of 
public health spending.  There are studies that focus on elders, as reviewed by Rice and Matsuoka 
(2004), but virtually all of these studies are either cross-sectional comparisons of elders with and 
without generous drug coverage, or simple before/after comparisons of drug copayment changes 
(which suffer from the problem of uncontrolled trends in drug utilization). The one exception is 
Johnson et. al. (1997), who studied an increase in copayments in one Medicare HMO, using a 
different Medicare HMO as a control.  This study finds no consistent impact of changes in 
copayments on drug utilization.  The second major limitation of this previous literature is that it 
does not go on, as RAND did, to examine the implications of changing utilization for either health 
or utilization elsewhere in the medical system.
4 One notable exception is Gaynor, Li and Vogt 
(2007) which found evidence of a spending offset in the non-elderly population.  
  A new paper by Finkelstein (2007) paints a more dramatic picture by looking at the 
introduction of the Medicare program.  Using variation in pre-existing levels of insurance coverage 
before the program was introduced, Finkelstein finds an enormous response of spending to the 
provision of insurance coverage, with an implied elasticity that is six times larger than in the HIE.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
this group, just evidence along these three measures; for other measures, such as varicose veins, health is worse in the free care 
group. 
4Recent work by Goldman et al. (2006) argues that higher copayments for prescription drugs leads to more hospitalizations, but this 
claim is based on combining the fact that higher copayments lead to less drug utilization with an estimate of the relationship between 
drug utilization and hospitalization.  The latter parameter is obtained by comparing hospitalization rates among those who do and do 
not comply with their drug regimes.  This may not reflect the reduction in drug use due to copayments so much as the type of  
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This suggests either that the elderly are more price-sensitive than the non-elderly, or that a system-
wide change of this nature had a bigger effect than individual randomization. 
 
Previous Work on the Supplemental Insurance 
  Of particular relevance to our analysis is the long-standing policy concern about the design 
of supplemental insurance for Medicare.  In particular, because supplemental insurance insulates 
beneficiaries from Medicare’s cost-sharing, it likely increases their utilization of Medicare-covered 
services (so long as those services are not inelastically demanded).  Atherly (2001) provides a 
review of the research history, observing that the literature consistently finds a positive correlation 
between supplemental insurance and Medicare expenditures. Estimates of the effect of this 
externality on Medicare range from zero (Wolfe and Goddeeris, 1991) to 72% increases in 
Medicare charges among unhealthy individuals (McCall et al., 1991).  However, none of the 
existing papers is able to fully surmount the important selection problem in the holding of Medigap 
policies documented by Ettner (1997). Studies such as Lillard and Rogowski (1995) use past work 
history as an instrument for employer-provided Medigap coverage, but past work history is itself 
likely correlated with demand for medical care and health.  Moreover, none of these studies 
assesses the impact of varying copayments for the elderly, only aggregate impact of having or not 
having supplemental insurance.  
  Goldman and Philipson (2007) raise the important, related point that optimal health 
insurance design should not merely consider own-price elasticities of demand for medical care, but 
also cross-price elasticities.  In the context of supplemental insurance, it is plausible that the cost-
sharing structure chosen by the supplemental insurer affects both the “insured good” (such as office 
                                                                                                                                                                  
individuals who do and do not comply.  
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visits) and “other services” (such as hospitalizations) that impose differential costs on Medicare.  
Thus, the net external effect of supplemental insurance on Medicare costs may be composed of two 
parts: the increase in utilization of the affected service, due to a decrease in the beneficiary’s out-of-
pocket costs, and an offsetting decrease in utilization of a substitute service (or an increase in 
utilization of a complementary service). 
 
The Institutional Setting 
  Our analysis focuses on changes in copayments for the health plans offered to public 
employees by the state of California through the CalPERS program.  This program provides 
insurance to 1.2 million of California’s active and retired civil servants and their dependents, 
making it the third largest purchaser of health insurance in the nation (behind the Federal 
Government and General Motors) (CalPERS, 2006).  Employees are offered a choice of two state-
run Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), PersCARE and PersChoice, as well as a variety of 
state-sanctioned HMO choices that have changed over time.  Choices are made every year during 
the month-long open enrollment period, between mid-September and mid-October.  For retirees, 
our population of interest, the state provides supplemental insurance that “wraps around” the 
coverage provided by the Medicare program. 
  The empirical approach of this project revolves around the policy change put in place by 
CalPERS.  The genesis of this policy change was the rapidly rising health care costs in the self-
funded CalPERS plans.  There was a 47% increase in PPO enrollment from 1997 through 2000, 
with another 25% increase expected for 2001, due partly to movements out of the HMO plans and 
lack of HMO availability in some areas.  There were also significant rises in costs per member, due  
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to both increased provider prices (reflecting the nationwide trend towards tougher bargaining by 
providers with managed care organizations) and increased utilization, particularly of prescription 
drugs.  As a result, the plan reserves had fallen from a level equal to 6.3 months of claims 
experience to basically zero (so that premium income was roughly equal to claims expenditures) 
(CalPERS, 2000). 
  In response to these pressures, the board of CalPERS in December 2000 voted to raise the 
copayments in their PPO plans as of February 2001.  They then decided, in April 2001, to follow 
suit for the HMO plans that contract through CalPERS, beginning in January 2002.  This policy 
change included a variety of copayment changes for the non-supplemental population. For the 
supplemental population, there were two changes: 
1.  A rise in physician office visit copayments for the HMOs from $0 to $10 in 2002.  There 
was no corresponding change for PPOs in 2001.    
2.  A rise in copayments for prescription drugs for all PPO plans from $5 for generics and $10 
for name brands to $5 for generics, $15 for formulary name brands, and $30 for non-
formulary name brand prescriptions, as well as a rise in mail order prescription copayments 
from $5 to $10/$25/$45, with a $1000 stop-loss in 2001. HMOs had a similar rise in 
copayments for prescription drugs in 2002; for HMOs, however, copayments prior to the 




Part II: Data and Empirical Strategy 
                                                 
5 The copayment was $1 for one of our HMOs and $5 for the other, but the former HMO represents 98% of the continuously enrolled 
HMO sample.  
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Data 
  For our analysis, we use a comprehensive database of all medical utilization data for four of 
the CalPERS plans between January, 2000 and September, 2003.  We focus on a panel of Medicare 
supplemental plan members who were continuously enrolled in their plan during our sample period, 
noting that this sample is not necessarily representative of the Medicare population.  The resulting 
data set includes information on medical utilization by 70,912 members; 93% of these members 
were over the age of 65 in January 2000.    
  By selecting a sample of continuously enrolled individuals, we risk potentially 
mismeasuring the population responsiveness of individuals to copayment changes.  If individuals 
switch out of plans raising copayments, and the individuals who switch have a sensitivity of 
medical care utilization with respect to price that is higher (lower) than average, then our estimated 
elasticities in this sample will be biased downward (upward) in absolute value.  Indeed, a special 
open enrollment period was established, between December 2000 and the end of January 2001, with 
the specific purpose of allowing plan members to switch plans in response the announcement of 
PPO copayment increases.  Such switching, however, does not seem to be of sufficient importance 
to bias our results.  We find, for example, that 92% of the members who were enrolled in our PPOs 
in February 2000 remained enrolled in the same plan in February 2001, despite the anticipated 
copayment increases in February 2001.  Indeed, this 92% retention rate was slightly higher than the 
91% retention rate, over the same period, at HMOs that were not expecting a copayment increase.  
Similarly, 92% of the members who were enrolled in our HMOs in February 2001 remained 
enrolled in the same plan in February 2002.  Again, despite the January 2002 copayment increase, 




6 As a result, when we re-estimate our models using the full sample of enrollees (including 
individuals who both enter and exit our plans), we get almost identical results to those presented 
here.
7 
  For each individual, we measure office visit utilization by the number of medical encounters 
which occurred in an office or outpatient setting during the month.  We measure drug utilization by 
the number of prescriptions filled during the month.  We measure hospital utilization with an 
indicator for whether or not the individual spent any days in the hospital during the month.  
  In our analysis, we compute an average of each utilization measure for each plan in each 
month, which yields 180 observations in our final data set (45 months*4 plans).  Thus, each of the 
180 observations on a utilization measure in our final data set reflects the average utilization per 
person among all continuously enrolled members of a single plan in a given month.  In order to 
document the impact of the policy change on copayments, we also calculate average copayments 
and deductibles across all visits (or prescription drug purchases) for each plan in each month.  Each 
of the 180 observations on copayments in our final data set reflects the average copayment per visit 
(or prescription drug purchase) in a single plan in a single month.
8   
  We analyze the impact of these policy changes on medical spending as well as utilization.  
Ideally, we would do this by having the payments associated with every medical encounter, and we 
would redo our analysis using these payments as the dependent variable.  In practice, however, 
                                                 
6 Both plans experienced 92% retention rates over the one-year period between February 2002 and February 2003, when neither 
experienced a copayment change.  This fact increases our confidence that the plans did not experience unusual attrition as a result of 
the policy changes. 
7 One exception to this statement is our results for hospitalizations. In the full sample, we get a small negative effect on overall 
hospitalizations for the 2002 change, rather than the small positive effect reported below.  But this appears to reflect pre-existing 
trends in the full sample of data, and our key results on hospitalization for the chronically ill are very similar. All the full-sample 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
8 When we analyze the 2002 copayment increase for office visits, we exclude office visit data from 2000.  One of the plans changed 
their coding of office visits between 2000 and 2001, generating a discontinuity in the data that is unrelated to any policy changes.  To 
avoid any spurious results based on this reporting change, we simply exclude all office visit data prior to 2001.  
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there is not any financial information on payments attached to HMO claims.  We therefore pursue 
an alternative approach where we use available data on total payments from PPO claims to impute 
total payments to each claim based on the primary diagnosis category of the office visit (or the 
NDC code of the prescription drug), and the average payment for an office visit with that diagnosis 
category (or for that specific drug) among all PPO claims.  Following Medicare Part B policy, we 
assume that Medicare made 80% of the total payments for office visits and that the CalPERS 
supplemental insurance plan paid the difference between the remaining 20% and any patient 
copayments. For drugs, we assume that the CalPERS supplemental insurance plan made all 
payments above the patient copayments. 
  For hospitalizations, where Medicare’s share of total payments is not a fixed percentage, we 
followed a different methodology.  Total hospital payments are the sum of imputed CalPERS 
insurance payments, imputed Medicare payments, and any actual cost-sharing paid by the patient. 
We imputed the first component based on the diagnosis code of the hospitalization and the average 
insurance payment for hospitalizations with the same diagnosis in the PPO data.  We imputed 
Medicare’s payments based on the diagnosis code of the hospitalization and the average Medicare 
payment for hospitalizations with that diagnosis code, using the universe of Medicare claims in the 
state of California during our sample period.
9  For cost-sharing, we used the actual amounts that 
were reported in the data.  We then constructed total hospital payments as the sum of these three 
                                                 
9 We used a 100% sample of Medicare Part A payments for patients whose residence was in California at the time of the 
hospitalization; Medicare patients who reside in other states but were in California at the time of hospitalization were excluded. For 
this sample of patients, we constructed average Medicare payments by principal diagnosis code for hospitalizations that occurred 
between January 2000 and September 2003. In order to reduce sampling error associated with rare diagnoses, diagnosis codes were 
first aggregated to levels indicated by the Clinical Classification System (CCS). To capture payments made to physicians for in-
hospital services rendered during these hospital stays, we used a 20% random sample of the above Part A sample for whom we had 
Part B claims. We further restricted these claims to those whose dates corresponded to a hospitalization (including the dates of 
admission and discharge) and whose service place was an overnight inpatient visit. We merged payments for these services with the 
corresponding Part A hospitalization. This analysis was performed at the Center for the Evaluative Clinical Sciences at Dartmouth 




  A clear concern with our approach for physician and hospital visits is that we assign the 
average payments per diagnosis, whereas ideally we would like to use the marginal payments for 
the given admission.  If we had complete data on all procedures performed at the hospital and at the 
office, we could do this, but our data include limited information on procedures. The bias from 
using average rather than marginal payments is unclear, but we have explored one exercise to assess 
its importance. Among those admitted to the hospital, we have regressed length of hospital stay on 
the policy dummy in our difference-in-difference framework.  If the marginal patients admitted due 
to higher physician/drug copayments are very different than the average patient admitted, then we 
should see a marginal change in the length of stay for hospital patients.  In fact, there is no 
significant effect on length of stay, providing at least crude evidence that the marginal and average 
patients are not very different. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
  Our analysis of this quasi-experimental change in CalPERS policy is fairly straightforward.  
We begin by estimating difference-in-difference models of the form: 
  UTILpt = α + βHIPAYpt + δp + λt + εpt 
Where UTIL is a measure of utilization (or out-of-pocket costs) for plan p in month t, α is a 
constant term, HIPAY is a dummy for increased copayments in plan p in month t (specifically, an 
interaction of an indicator variable for being in a plan where greater cost-sharing is instituted and an 
indicator for being in the post-increase era), and δp and λt are plan and month fixed effects,  
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respectively.
10   In this model, the effect of the copayment change is identified by β, which 
measures the change in utilization in the plans with a copayment change relative to those without.  
For each type of utilization, we estimate two models of this type: one which separately identifies 
effects on PPOs (focusing on data from January 2000 to December 2001), and another which 
separately identifies effects on HMOs (focusing on data from February 2001 to September 2003).  
Regressions are weighted by the number of plan members who are continuously enrolled during our 
sample period in each plan. 
  There are two potential problems with this approach.  First, utilization is likely 
autocorrelated within plans; this autocorrelation causes the standard errors in ordinary regressions 
to be understated.  To address this issue, we estimate our regressions using Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) allowing for plan-specific autocorrelation as well as plan-specific 
heteroskedasticity.
11  
Second, there may be underlying trends in utilization, which can confound the estimation of 
the causal effects that we are interested in.   A particularly worrisome source of such trends for the 
HMO analysis is the earlier PPO policy change.  That is, our difference-in-difference analysis for 
the HMO policy change compares the change in utilization in the HMOs between the pre-policy 
period (February 2001 – December 2001) and the post-policy period (January 2002 – September 
                                                 
10 Because we use a fixed panel of enrollees, there are no time-varying differences between HMO and PPO enrollees.  Any fixed 
differences are captured by the plan fixed effects in our regressions. We chose to perform our analysis at the plan-month level in 
order to be as conservative as possible about our standard errors. 
11 This is a non-trivial issue that we have explored from a variety of angles. The GLS procedure reports  , and 
its variance as  . The relevant variance-covariance matrix is estimated as  , and operationalized with 
(where T is the number of time-periods and  is a square matrix of dimension equal to the number of plans). The most 
natural solution to our problem would be to follow the insights of Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) and cluster on the four 
plans. However, the approach relies critically on the asymptotic justification that the number of clusters goes to infinity; with too few 
clusters the cluster-robust standard errors are biased downwards severely. Empirically, we found that this approach produced 
standard-errors that were 0%-35% smaller than those obtained from our GLS procedure.  Alternatively, if we ignore the potential  
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2003) to the change in utilization in the PPOs over the same periods.  If the policy change in the 
PPOs had immediate effects in February, 2001, this is not a problem.  But it is possible that 
utilization in the PPOs adjusted slowly to the PPO policy change, with full adjustment only by the 
end of 2001.  If this were the case, absent any other change, there would be a negative utilization 
difference between 2001 and 2002 for the PPO, leading to a spurious positive difference-in-
difference estimate of the effect of the 2002 policy change on HMO utilization. To deal with this 
concern, we present dynamic models of the policy change effect, estimating separate treatment 
effects for each quarter before and after the policy change.
12  In this way, we can examine whether 
any changes in utilization in 2002 represent the effects of a slow-moving relative trend or a sharp 
break when the policy is put in place.  If the dynamic model indicates the latter, it suggests that we 




  Table 1 presents the means of the data.  We show the mean utilization rate and copayments 
for each type of utilization for HMOs and PPOs in each year.  Once again, we have no pre-period 
data for the PPO policy change for office visits due to data limitations.  Several discontinuities that 
preview our ensuing difference-in-difference specifications are apparent in these tabulations.  First, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
auto-correlation and cluster on plan-by-month (45 months x 4 plans = 180 clusters) we obtain standard-errors that are similar, though 
0%-20% smaller, to those obtained from the more conservative GLS procedure. 
12 In addition, we tested the sensitivity of our 2002 policy change results to excluding data from the first 3 months after the 2001 
policy change when into effect (February, March, and April of 2001) and found that the results were unaffected by this exclusion. 
13 As further confirmation, we also examined  data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, the largest publicly available 
source of data on medical utilization by Medicare recipients,  between 1995 and 2004—a timeframe that predates our analysis by 
several years, and therefore allows for the examination of differential trends. The supplemental insurance categories reported in the 
MCBS allow for the identification of Medicare HMOs, but do not distinguish beneficiaries in a Medicare PPO uniquely; this group is 
therefore contained in the groups labeled Employer Sponsored Insurance (ESI) and Self-Purchased. We found that enrollees in 
Medicare HMOs and those with ESI and self-purchased supplemental insurance follow similar trends in utilization for total spending, 
inpatient visits, outpatient visits and prescriptions drugs, as those with employer-sponsored insurance and self-purchased Medigap.  
These results are available upon request.  
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average copayments for an office visit jump from $0.14 in 2001 to $10.11 in 2002 for the HMOs, 
while they remain flat at below $1 in the (control) PPO plans over time.
14 Over the same period, 
average office visits fell by 0.03 per member per month in the HMOs (relative to an increase of 
0.07 visits per member per month in the PPOs, which experienced no copayment increase). Thus, 
the means suggest a differential decline in office visits for HMO members at the time that office 
visit copayments increased for them. 
  Average out-of-pocket payments for a prescription drug increased from $6.93 in 2000 to 
$13.50 in 2001 for PPOs.  Over the same period, average drug utilization rose by 0.09 prescriptions 
per member per month in the PPOs, relative to an increase of 0.16 prescriptions per member per 
month in the HMOs, which had not yet experienced a drug copayment increase.  These means, then, 
suggest the possibility of a relative decline in drug utilization resulting from the increased drug 
copayments for the PPOs in 2001.  For the HMO policy change, the means show an increase in 
prescription drug copayments from $1.27 in 2001 to $7.63 in 2002.  They also show a decrease of 
0.09 prescriptions per member per month in the HMOs between 2001 and 2002, relative to an 
increase of 0.14 drugs per member per month in PPOs during the same period.  Once again, the 
means suggest a relative decline in drug utilization resulting from the increased drug copayments 
for the HMOs in 2002. 
  Finally, we show means for hospitalizations for each year and type of plan.  All 
hospitalization rates in Table 1 and in later regression tables are multiplied by 10,000, in order to 
make the numbers easier to read.  Hospitalization rates increase over time for both types of plans 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
14 The fact that the average copays in our data are not precisely $0 for the HMOs in 2001 or for the PPOs throughout the sample 
period may reflect the fact that some of the encounters that we identify as “office visits” were misclassified or it may reflect some 
minor misreporting of copayments in the data.   
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throughout the sample period, presumably reflecting the aging of our panel.  Table 1 does not 
suggest an obvious increase or decrease in hospitalizations associated with the policy changes  
 
Part III: Basic Results 
Office Visits   
We begin our analysis by examining the effect of the 2002 copayment increase on office 
visits in the HMOs.  This policy change increased copayments from a base of $0 to $10 for those in 
the supplemental plan.  The results of our analysis are shown in Table 2.  Each cell reports a 
coefficient and standard error (in parentheses).   
  The first column shows the basic difference-in-difference estimate of the impact on 
copayments per visit.  The statistically significant coefficient of 10.06 is virtually identical to the 
$10 increase that we expect.   
  The second column of the table shows the difference-in-difference estimate of the impact on 
office visit utilization.  There is a sizeable and highly statistically significant reduction of 0.132 
office visits per member per month.  Relative to the pre-period mean of 0.753, this is a 17.5% 
decline in office visits.  While this appears to be a large response to a $10 increase in copayments, it 
is important to note that the $10 increase represents a very large percentage increase in out-of-
pocket costs for patients, relative to the $0 copayment in the pre-policy period.  The implied arc-
elasticity of demand for office visits is -0.10, which is quite similar to the arc-elasticities produced  
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by the RAND HIE for the non-elderly.
15  Keeler and Rolph (1988) report arc-elasticities for 
outpatient services that ranged from -0.17 to -0.31.  Our arc-elasticities for office visits are, 
therefore, slightly lower than – but nonetheless strikingly similar to – the HIE’s arc-elasticities for 
similar service types. 
  The third column explores the dynamic pattern of coefficients by showing the effects for 
each of the three quarters before, the quarter of, and all quarters after the policy change; the results 
are shown graphically in Figure 1.  All coefficients for the dynamic model are measured relative to 
the omitted quarter, which is 2 quarters prior to the policy change. There is a large rise in office 
visits in the quarter before the policy change, which presumably reflects anticipation of the change, 
and then a large and immediate drop in utilization in the quarter after the policy change.  This graph 
clearly suggests a causal impact of the copayment increase itself, and not a spurious trend in 
utilization. 
  Much of the large rise immediately before and fall immediately after the copayment change 
likely represents a one-time shift in the timing of office visits, and not a fundamental change in 
utilization patterns in response to this higher patient cost.  Thus, in the last column of the table, we 
show the difference-in-difference estimate excluding the quarters immediately before and after the 
policy change (the estimated change in copayments is almost identical when we excluded these 
quarters).  There is a sizeable decline in the coefficient on office visits to -0.095, although it 
remains highly significant.  The implied arc-elasticity is -0.07.  We will use this specification as our 
baseline for the remaining results on office visits. 
                                                 






  There were large increases in copayments for prescription drugs in both 2001 (for PPOs) 
and 2002 (for HMOs), as described earlier.  Unlike physician office visits, however, the exact 
magnitude of the copayment change for each member depends on the mix of drugs they use, as the 
copayments changed differently for different types of drugs. 
  Table 3 shows estimated effects for the 2001 and 2002 policy changes.  The effects of these 
changes on copayments per drug are shown in columns 1 and 5, respectively.  For the 2001 policy 
change, we estimate a $7.25 rise in average copayment.  For the 2002 policy change, the estimated 
change in out-of-pocket charges is slightly smaller at $6.74.  However, these first stage estimates 
confound two effects: the static effect of rising copayments, holding constant the pre-policy mix of 
drugs, and the dynamic effect of consumers shifting to less expensive drugs in response.  We 
believe that the correct first stage estimate would include only the first, static part of this response 
and ignore the second portion. To estimate this static copayment change, we measure utilization in 
the pre-policy period, multiply by both old and new copayments, and calculate the difference in 
copayments for this fixed set of drugs. Using this methodology, we get larger estimates of the 
copayment increases -- $8.06 for the 2001 change and $7.26 for the 2002 change. 
  The effects of these changes on the number of prescriptions are shown in the next columns 
(columns 2 and 6), using the basic difference-in-difference specification.   In each case, there is a 
negative and significant effect on the average number of prescriptions filled.   For PPO enrollees in 
2001, there is a reduction in prescriptions filled of 0.110 per member per month, relative to the pre- 
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policy mean of 1.97.  There is an $8.06 rise in average copayments in 2001, relative to a pre-policy 
mean of $6.93.  This implies an arc-elasticity of approximately -0.08 of drug utilization with respect 
to its patient cost.  For HMO enrollees in 2002, there is a reduction in prescriptions filled of 0.276, 
relative to the pre-period mean for that group of 1.39.   There is a $7.26 rise in copayments for this 
population, relative to a pre-policy mean of $1.28. This implies an arc-elasticity of -0.15, which is 
quite similar to the arc-elasticity of demand for prescription drugs in 2001, to the arc-elasticity of 
demand for office visits and, again, to the arc-elasticities obtained from the RAND HIE for the non-
elderly.
16    
  The dynamics of these responses are reported in columns 3 and 7 in Table 3 and are shown 
graphically in the two panels of Figure 2.  The results clearly indicate that there were no pre-
existing trends towards less drug use.  Thus, the estimated utilization decline appears to be a causal 
impact of the policy change.  For the 2001 change, however, we once again see that there is an 
anticipation effect in the quarter before the policy change.  To avoid such timing effects, we again 
drop the quarter before and after the policy change, and show the results in Columns 4 and 8 of 
Table 3.
17  In the case of the 2001 policy change, the estimated effect decreases by just over a half, 
so that the implied arc-elasticity falls to only -0.03.   
Our experiment also allows us to explore the behavioral response to different types of drugs. 
By assembling a panel of three practicing physicians and two pharmacists, we classified each drug 
                                                 
16 Using the alternative estimates of the copayment increase, which incorporate both the static and dynamic effects of policy change, 
the implied elasticities remain -0.08 for the 2001 policy change and -0.15 for the 2002 policy change. Therefore, the use of the more 
sophisticated (and correct) method of estimating copayment changes does not substantively alter our results. 
17 If HMO enrollees began stockpiling prescription drugs as much as 8 months prior to the January 2002 policy change (because the 
decision to increase copayments was made in April of 2001), we would see this behavior in dynamic graphs estimated at the 
quarterly level (which are reported in the paper in Figure 2, Panel B). In none of the pre-treatment quarters do we find evidence of 
significant increases in utilization, as would be the case if drugs were being stockpiled.  
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into one of three categories:
18 (1) Acute care drugs are those that, if not taken, will increase the 
probability of an adverse health event within a month or two (examples are anticonvulsants, anti-
malarials and anti-angials, coronary vasodilators and thrombolytics). (2) Chronic care medications 
are designed to treat more persistent conditions that, if not treated, will result in a potentially 
adverse health event within the year (examples include analgesics, antivirals, ACE inhibitors, 
antigout medications, beta-blockers, hypertension drugs, statins, and glaucoma medications). The 
final category includes medications which, while necessary to improve the quality of life, will not 
result in an adverse health event if not taken, by virtue of their providing symptom relief as opposed 
to affecting the underlying disease process (examples are acne medications, antihistamines, motion 
sickness medications, cold remedies, relief of pain drugs).
19  Each category contained a mix of 
drugs from the various formulary tiers, so the specific elasticities, by themselves, are not entirely 
informative.  However, we found substantial responsiveness for all three types of drugs, suggesting 
that members decreased their use of drugs that, according to our expert panel, were likely 
preventing short-term and long-term adverse health events. 
 
Hospital Utilization 
  As highlighted above, a major concern with increased patient cost-sharing is the so-called 
“offset effect”: by raising the cost of going to the doctor or filling prescriptions, and therefore 
reducing physician or drug use, increased cost-sharing may delay necessary care and increase 
                                                 
18  Consistent with the clinical literature on expert physician panels, our panel exhibited considerable variance of opinion, especially 
in the distinction between acute and chronic care drugs. We classified a drug as belonging to a certain class if the majority of experts 
believed that it was in that class. During their deliberations, our panels had access to the Physician Desk Reference and the internet to 
inform their choices.  
19 We also examined a simpler classification based on the work Tambyn et. al (2001). This approach classifies drugs based on 
whether a drug was “essential” or not. This classification, however, excludes many drugs with uncertain classification (for example,  
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hospitalizations.  Indeed, the fact that individuals in our sample decreased utilization, even for 
drugs that were classified as “acute care” by our panel of experts (or “essential” by Tamblyn et al. 
(2001)), increases this concern.  The RAND HIE found no evidence for such offset effects, but 
there has been little subsequent investigation of this question, particularly for the elderly.  This 
policy change provides an excellent laboratory for testing for such offset effects, in response to 
reduced prescription drug utilization (in 2001) and in response to both reduced office visits and 
reduced prescription drug utilization (in 2002). 
  We explore the effect of both policy changes on hospital utilization in Table 4.  The 
difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of the two policy changes on hospital utilization are 
shown separately in columns 1 and 4.  Interestingly, both coefficients are positive, although only 
that for the 2002 policy change is statistically significant.  For the 2002 policy change, we find an 
increase in the probability of any hospital days during the month of 0.078%, relative to the pre-
policy mean of 1.30%, or a rise of 6.0%.  As the dynamic results show, both in Table 4 and 
graphically in Figure 3, these effects do not appear to reflect pre-existing trends.  However, the 
coefficients for the 2001 changes are small and statistically insignificant.  The larger response in 
2002 may be due to the rise in office visit copayments under the HMO plans and the larger 
reduction in prescription drug use.  These results suggest some potential “offset” effect of the 
changes in coverage for physician and prescription services, in contrast to the RAND HIE.  The 
finding of such an offset effect in the short run is quite striking, and it is likely that any offset effect 
would operate more strongly over time.  But this short run effect is not implausible, as we discuss in 
Part IV below, which further explores the nature of this offset effect and its implications for 
                                                                                                                                                                  
antibiotics and drugs for gastritis). For this reason, we preferred our own classification, but note that the results are similar to those 




   
Summary 
  To summarize our basic results, we have found that there is clear price responsiveness for 
the elderly to coinsurance for both physician visits and prescription drugs, with implied arc-
elasticities that are similar to those of the RAND HIE.  We also found evidence of an “offset effect” 
of higher coinsurance in terms of increased hospitalizations.  This offset effect may mitigate any 
costs savings from lower office visit or drug utilization; the magnitude of such an offset is explored 
below.   
 
Part IV: The Offset Effect 
  Perhaps the most striking finding from our analysis thus far is the strong evidence of an 
offset effect in 2002, with hospital visits rising as office visit and prescription drug utilization falls.  
In this section, we explore this effect further by moving from utilization measures to our (imputed) 
payment measures.  All of the results presented below exclude the quarters before and after the 
policy change; this exclusion lowers the response of physician visits in 2002, but has no effect on 
either prescription drug or hospitalization estimates.  It is important to recall that our payment 
information is not measured directly in our data but rather is imputed, so that our conclusions about 
payment results are somewhat more uncertain than our utilization conclusions.   
 
Quantifying the Offset 
  The results of this exercise are presented in the first panel of Table 5, which presents the  
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same difference-in-difference regressions as in the earlier tables, but replacing utilization measures 
with expenditures.  For physician visits, we find a decline in imputed expenditures of $13.16, which 
is 14.1% of the base cost of $93.25 per person per month.  This effect is similar to the 12.6% effect 
that we found using visit counts.  For prescription drugs, we find a reduction in payments of $23.06 
for the 2002 policy change, which is 32% of the base spending on drugs.  Thus, in total, we find a 
reduction in office visit plus prescription drug payments of $36.22 for the 2002 policy change.  At 
the same time, we find an increase in hospitalization payments of $7.23, which is 5.4% of baseline 
hospital expenditures.  These results suggest that increases in hospital spending offset 20% of the 
savings from higher copayments on physicians and prescription drugs.  While this offset is sizeable, 
it is unlikely to be enough to reverse any conclusions about the efficacy of copayment changes. 
 
Payer-Specific Offsets and the Fiscal Externality of Supplemental Insurance 
  Importantly, however, this offset does not operate equally for all payers.  The next panel of 
Table 5 divides these responses into payments by Medicare and payments by the CalPERS 
supplemental insurance plans.  Medicare, in this time period, did not cover prescription drugs, so 
the only effects on the Medicare program are lower physician costs and higher hospital costs. 
  The results of this division by payer are quite interesting.  The physician savings accrue 
roughly equally to Medicare and to CalPERS, despite the fact that Medicare pays 80% of the 
charges for physician visits and CalPERS pays only 20%.  This is because CalPERS obtains all the 
benefit from the shifting of payments from insurer to patient, while Medicare obtains only 80% of 
the savings from lower physician utilization (with CalPERS also getting the rest).  Thus, when the 
HMOs introduce the $10 physician copayment, there is a total reduction in spending on physicians  
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of $13.16, of which Medicare receives roughly 80% (0.8*$13.16 = $10.53).  Meanwhile, CalPERS 
obtains the other 20% of savings from reduced utilization (0.2*13.16 = $2.63), plus the transfer of 
costs from the supplemental insurance plans to patient ($10 per visit, with an average of 0.86 visits 
per enrollee per month, equals $8.60), for a total of $11.23. 
  The savings from reduced prescription drug utilization, of course, accrue totally to 
CalPERS.  These savings are equal to the total reduction in dollars spent on prescription drugs, plus 
the cost-shift from CalPERS to enrollees through the increased copayments.  At the same time, 
Medicare bears most of the increased cost of hospitalizations.  Of the $7.23 in extra hospital costs, 
Medicare pays $5.58, and CalPERS pays only $1.49.  Thus, on net, Medicare saves $10.53 on 
physician visits, but pays $5.58 more in hospitalization costs, so that the offset effect for the 
Medicare program in isolation is 53%.  At the same time, the offset for CalPERS is close to zero, 
since CalPERS pays relatively little of the hospital costs but receives half of the savings in 
physician visits and all of the savings on prescription drugs.  Thus, while the offset is small overall, 
it is a major consideration for the Medicare program.   
   
Heterogeneity in Offset 
  While this overall offset effect is fairly modest, there is heterogeneity in the offset that has 
important implications for insurance design.  Table 6 divides our sample in five ways to explore 
heterogeneity by type of enrollee: by income (terciles of the income distribution, based on zip code 
median income); by age (65 to 74, 75 to 84, and 85 and older); by intensity of spending in 2000 
(terciles of the overall spending distribution in the period before any policy changes); by Charlson 
index (a measure of patient health described below); and by categories of chronic illness (described  
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further below). 
  Table 6 has panels for each of these types of heterogeneity, with rows for each category 
within the type.   The first three columns show the results for spending on office visits, prescription 
drugs, and hospitalizations.  The fourth column shows the total offset effect, calculated directly 
from these first three columns.  The fifth and six columns show the offset effect for Medicare and 
CalPERS, respectively, which are calculated from payer-specific spending regressions.  These 
regressions are not shown, but follow exactly the same pattern as in Table 5: increases in hospital 
spending accrue about 80% to Medicare and 20% to CalPERS; reductions in prescription drug 
spending accrue completely to CalPERS (and are higher than reductions in total drug spending due 
to the cost shift from enrollees). 
  The first panel shows results by income tercile.  Here we find that there are relatively flat 
effects across income groups.  The effect on hospitalizations is somewhat smaller for the highest 
income tercile, and the effect on prescription drug utilization somewhat larger, so that the offset 
declines with income.  None of these differences, however, are statistically significant.  Thus, there 
is little heterogeneity by income. 
  The results by age, however, suggest more heterogeneity.  As age increases, we find similar 
or even smaller effects on physician and prescription drug spending – but much larger effects on 
hospital spending.  As a result, the implied offset is less than 20% for those 65-74, but over 40% for 
those 85 and older.  For the Medicare program in isolation, there is a 70% offset for those 75-84, 
and an offset well above 100% (i.e. Medicare is losing money from this policy change) for those in 
the oldest group.  Once again, however, the hospital results are relatively imprecise across age 
groups, so that these differences are not statistically significant.  
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  The results by (ex-ante) spending tercile are even more striking.  There is relatively little 
variation in physician spending effects by tercile, and a rising reduction in prescription drug 
spending by tercile.  Most striking, however, is the hospitalization effect: the effect is negative for 
the first tercile, small and positive for the second tercile, and very large for the third tercile, 
implying that hospital spending rose by $23 per enrollee per month as a result of this policy.  
Overall, there is an offset of almost 50% for the top tercile of spenders: for every dollar society 
saves in prescription and physician spending, hospitalization costs increase by 45 cents.  
Unsurprisingly, this implies an enormous offset for the Medicare program in isolation: the Medicare 
program loses $1.19 in increased hospitalization expenditures for each $1 in physician spending 
savings.   
  These results are echoed in the findings for the Charlson index, which we divide into three 
categories.  The Charlson index is a weighted sum of indicators for the presence of certain 
conditions, where the weights reflect relative increases in one-year mortality risk for a person; 
mortality risk increases with the index. To calculate the index, we use diagnosis codes from each 
individual’s claims history to identify the presence of each of 19 conditions, and then apply the 
weights described in Charlson et al. (1987).  We then run regressions separately for individuals with 
Charlson indices of 0 (i.e. individuals with none of the conditions), 1-3, and 4 or greater.  We find a 
modest increase, in absolute value, in the physician and prescription drug effects by Charlson index, 
but the differential effect on hospital spending is even more striking.  Indeed, the hospital spending 
effect is enormous for those who are unhealthiest by this measure, with hospital spending 
increasing by almost $2 for every $1 saved on other spending – and Medicare’s hospital spending 
increasing by more than $6 for every $1 saved on physician spending!  
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  Finally, the last panel in the table explores the findings by chronic illness.  Again, we use 
the diagnosis codes from each individual’s claims history to identify individuals who suffer from 
each of seven chronic illnesses.
20  We then run regressions separately for the sub-samples with and 
without chronic illnesses.  The first two rows compare those with any of the seven chronic illnesses 
to those with none of the chronic illnesses.  In each category the effects are much larger for those 
with any chronic illness.  Yet the most striking difference is in hospitalization effects; there is no 
effect on hospital payments for those with no chronic illness, while there is an $18.25 per person 
per month increase in hospitalization payments for those with chronic illness.  Overall, for those 
with chronic illness, there is a roughly 43% offset; for the Medicare program in isolation, the offset 
is over 100%. 
  The remaining rows of the table consider each of the seven chronic illnesses separately.  The 
results vary across type of illness, with particularly large offsets for those with hypertension, 
diabetes, arthritis, and affective disorders, and relatively little offset for those with hypercholesterol, 
asthma, and gastritis.  In no category does the overall offset approach one; that is, in every single 
case, the overall medical system saved money when CalPERS raised copayments.  But in many 
cases, the Medicare program was a significant loser: the most striking case is affective disorders, 
where most of the savings are on prescription drugs, so that Medicare is losing almost $8 in 
increased hospitalization spending for each $1 it is saving on prescription drugs. 
 
Plausibility 
  A major concern with all of these results is the plausibility that such a large effect on 
hospitalizations could arise so quickly after changes in physician and prescription drug copayments.  
                                                 
20 Our chronic illness definitions follow Goldman et al. (2004).  
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We address that concern in four ways. First, we note that two other prominent papers have reported 
substantial effects of decreased use of prescription drugs on adverse events.  Neither paper has a 
strictly defined control group (in the first, identification is cross-sectional and, in the second, 
identification is over time), but their results are consistent with our findings. Hsu et al. (2006) find 
that Medicare beneficiaries whose pharmacy benefits were subject to a cap had 13 percent higher 
(non-elective) hospitalizations and 22 percent higher death rates than beneficiaries whose benefits 
were not capped. Among patient who used
 drugs for hypertension, hyperlipidemia, or diabetes,
 non-
elective hospitalizations increased by 27 percent, and deaths by 33 percent. Tamblyn et.al (2001) 
find that the rate of emergency department hospitalizations for the elderly, increased by 14.2 per 
10,000 patient-months in the 17 months after patient cost-sharing was instituted.   
  Second, since the offset effect is concentrated among those with chronic illness, we 
extended our analysis of prescription drug responses to examine the use of prescription drugs that 
are specific to each individual’s chronic condition.  These disease-specific drugs represent a direct 
channel to increasing the risk of hospitalization for the chronically ill. By assembling a team of 
physicians and pharmacists,
21 we identified the classes of drug that would be most relevant to the 
treatment of each chronic condition (e.g. statins for high cholesterol; antacids, acid blockers, and 
proton pump inhibitors for gastritis).  If the increased hospitalizations among the chronically ill 
were caused by decreased management of their chronic illness through prescription drugs, we 
would expect to see a decline in the use of drugs that are specific to the chronic condition.  Indeed, 
for those with any chronic illness, we find that about 40% of the decrease in prescription drugs 
comes in the form of drugs that are intended to treat the chronic illness.  This finding increases our 
                                                 
21 We are grateful to the three internists/generontologists at Dartmouth Medical School, and the two at Harvard Medical 
School, who assisted us in this effort.  
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confidence that the increase in hospitalizations among the chronically ill could be driven by a 
decline in management of their chronic illness. 
  Third, recall from our earlier discussion that these policy changes led to a statistically 
significant decrease in use of “acute care” drugs; these drugs included those medications that, if not 
taken, could lead to an adverse health event within a month or two.  After finding the results 
reported in this paper, we asked a subset of our physician panel (comprising the 3 physicians who 
were internists and gerontologists) as well as two new physicians where this effect would be 
greatest, and they reported that it would be mostly likely to operate quickly for those with diabetes 
and hypertension, and less so for asthma, because the decreased use for asthma patients would 
largely reflect reduced use of anti-histamines.  While these interviews constitute informal evidence, 
they are generally quite consistent with the findings in Table 6 of our paper, which show 
statistically significant increases in hospital payments for individuals with hypertension and 
diabetes, but statistically insignificant increases for individuals with asthma. 
  Finally, we note that the hospital offset effect that we find actually implies a rather modest 
direct offset between reduced office visit/drug utilization and increased hospitalization.  For 
example, our baseline hospitalization result in column 6 of Table 4 reflects only 7 additional 
hospitalizations per month per 10,000 members.  In comparison, the coefficients from the office 
visit and prescription drug regressions suggest 950 fewer monthly office visits per 10,000 members 
and 2,610 fewer monthly prescription drug purchases per 10,000 members.  Even if only disease-
specific drug utilization matters, this implies that a reduction in monthly prescription drug 
purchases of roughly 700 leads to 7 more hospitalizations per 10,000 members.  Only in rare cases, 
then, does the decreased use of office visits and prescription drugs translate into a hospitalization.  
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In addition, it is worth noting that the magnitude of our estimated hospitalization effects are 
consistent with Tamblyn et al. (2001), which reports that a reduction of 1700 “essential” drugs per 
10,000 members is associated with an increase of 7 adverse events (including acute care hospital 
admissions, long-term care admissions, and death) and 14 emergency department visits per 10,000 
member-months.   
 
Part V: Conclusions and Implications 
  The rapid rise in both the share of our population that is elderly, and the spending per 
elderly person, has placed pressure on both public and private insurers to find new ways to control 
medical costs in this population.  A number of approaches have been suggested, but forefront 
among them is increased consumer cost-consciousness.  While Medicare has relatively high 
copayments and deductibles, these “holes” are filled by supplementary insurance for most elderly.  
Thus, the elderly typically face very low copayments on most medical utilization. 
  Our results show that higher copayments for office visits and prescription drugs can have a 
real effect in terms of reducing medical spending by the elderly.  The effects are large in absolute 
terms, suggesting that moving from a $0 to a $10 copayment led to a 20% reduction in physician 
visits, and that a roughly $7 copayment rise, on average, reduced prescription drug use by 20%.  
Because the percentage increases in copayments were large, however, the implied arc-elasticities 
are similar to those reported in the RAND HIE for the non-elderly. 
  Most interestingly, we document the first convincing evidence for an offset effect of higher 
copayments.  While previous work has conjectured that such an offset might be present, the only 
convincing evidence, from the RAND HIE, rejected the notion of an offset, suggesting instead that  
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physician and hospital care were complements. Overall, we find a rather modest offsetting rise in 
hospital care when physician and prescription drug copayments are raised.  But we find substantial 
offsets for the sickest populations with chronic diseases, suggesting that, for chronically ill 
populations, there is little financial gain to higher copayments.   
  These findings have several important implications for optimal health insurance design..  
The first is that the fiscal externality associated with supplemental insurance coverage, which has 
been the subject of much policy discussion, may be more modest than originally presumed.  This is 
because the increase in physician and drug spending arising from supplemental coverage is 
substantially offset (for the Medicare program) by the fall in hospital costs. 
Second, the results from RAND clearly implied that optimal health insurance would feature 
high patient coinsurance up to an income-related out-of-pocket limit.  Our findings qualify that 
result, suggesting further that optimal insurance would be tied to underlying health status, with 
chronically ill patients facing lower cost-sharing.  The cost-sharing increases in our data were 
sufficiently modest that income-related out-of-pocket limits alone would not accomplish this goal, 
so specific targeting of copayments may be required. 
  Finally, our findings have implications for the design of Medicare’s new prescription drug 
benefit.   One of the most controversial features of Medicare’s new prescription drug benefit is the 
so-called “doughnut hole”: the gap in prescription drug coverage for beneficiaries with total drug 
costs that exceed $2,250 per year, until their drug costs exceed $5,100 per year.  Our results suggest 
that this “doughnut hole,” by increasing coinsurance rates to 100% for some of the most chronically 
ill Medicare beneficiaries, could increase Medicare’s costs.  In particular, those beneficiaries who 
are affected by the “doughnut hole” are likely to be similar to the chronically ill sub-populations  
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where we found that increased Medicare hospital spending exceeded any savings from reduced 
prescription drug and office visit utilization.  Future research should carefully explore the full 
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Table 1: Means of Key Dependent Variables 
By Type of Plan and Year 
 
  PPOs  HMOs 
  Pre-
policy 
Post-policy  Pre-policy  Post-policy 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2000  2001  2002  2003 
 
Office Visits 
               
Average 
copayment per 
visit (in dollars) 
 





-  1.07  1.14  1.19  -  0.75  0.72  0.75 
Prescription 
Drugs 
               
Average 
copayment per 
drug (in dollars) 
 





1.98  2.07  2.21  2.44  1.27  1.43  1.34  1.50 
Hospitalizations                 
Share of 
members with 
any hospital days 
during the month 
(x10,000) 
 
156.7  169.8  182.2  206.7  119.5  131.0  149.0  174.3 
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Table 2: Effects of 2002 HMO Office Visit Copayment Increase 




(dollars per drug) 
Utilization 
(Number of office visits per member per month) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




  -.095** 
(.012) 
HIPAYt-4      .016 
(.018) 
 
HIPAYt-3      .0002 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt-1      .130** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt      -.036** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt+1      -.094** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt+2      -.071** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt+3      -.082** 
(.021) 
 
HIPAYt+4      -.101** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt+5      -.113** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt+6      -.029** 
(.016) 
 
N  128  128  128  104 
** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Each column shows coefficients from a different regression; standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The 
dependent variable is indicated on the column heading; the independent variable is indicated on the row 
label.  Regressions control for plan and month fixed effects.  They are estimated by GLS, allowing for plan-
specific autocorrelation and plan-specific heteroskedasticity.  Regressions include data from February 2001 
through September 2003.  Column 4 excludes data from the 3 months before and after the policy change, in 
order to eliminate the effects from any temporary shifts in the timing of care.  
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Table 3: Effects of Drug Copayment Increases 
On Drug Utilization 







(Number of drugs per 





(Number of drugs per  
member per month) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 










  -.261** 
(.021) 
HIPAYt-5      -.030 
(.034) 
         
HIPAYt-4      -.075** 
(.020) 
      .005 
(.029) 
 
HIPAYt-3      -.023 
(.021) 
      .016 
(.017) 
 
HIPAYt-1      .093** 
(.021) 
      .039** 
(.017) 
 
HIPAYt      -.101** 
(.020) 
      -.236** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt+1      -.073** 
(.020) 
      -.219** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt+2      -.082** 
(.020) 
      -.220** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt+3      -.052 
(.034) 
      -.189** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt+4              -.320** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt+5              -.312** 
(.016) 
 
HIPAYt+6              -.269** 
(.016) 
 
N  80  80  80  58  124  124  124  100 
** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Each column shows coefficients from a different regression; standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The 
dependent variable is indicated on the column heading; the independent variable is indicated on the row 
label.  Regressions control for plan and month fixed effects.  They are estimated by GLS, allowing for plan-
specific autocorrelation and plan-specific heteroskedasticity.  Columns 1-4 include data from January 2000 
through November 2001, and Columns 5-8 include data from March 2001 through September 2003.  
Columns 4 and 8 exclude data from the 3 months before and after the relevant policy change, in order to 
eliminate the effects of any temporary shifts in the timing of care.  
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Table 4: Effects of Copayment Increases on the Probability That a Member  
Experiences Any Hospital Days During the Month 
  2001 Policy Change  2002 Policy Change 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
HIPAY  3.69 
(2.61) 




  7.16** 
(2.29) 
HIPAYt-5    -0.22 
(6.83) 
       
HIPAYt-4    -8.96 
(4.33) 
    3.79 
(5.00) 
 
HIPAYt-3    4.51 
(4.43) 
    -4.81 
(4.48) 
 
HIPAYt-1    -4.67 
(4.43) 
    -4.20 
(4.48) 
 
HIPAYt    -4.01 
(4.32) 
    -0.66 
(4.31) 
 
HIPAYt+1    7.10 
(4.32) 
    8.33* 
(4.32) 
 
HIPAYt+2    3.17 
(4.32) 
    1.09 
(4.32) 
 
HIPAYt+3    -0.85 
(4.94) 
    14.22** 
(4.32) 
 
HIPAYt+4          6.21 
(4.32) 
 
HIPAYt+5          4.72 
(4.32) 
 
HIPAYt+6          7.00 
(4.35) 
 
N  96  96  72  128  128  104 
** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. 
Each column shows coefficients from a different regression; standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The 
dependent variable is indicated on the column heading; the independent variable is indicated on the row 
label.  Regressions control for plan and month fixed effects.  They are estimated by GLS, allowing for plan-
specific autocorrelation and plan-specific heteroskedasticity.  Columns 1-3 include data from January 2000 
through December 2001, and Columns 4-6 include data from February 2001 through September 2003. 
Columns 3 and 6 exclude data from the 3 months before and after the relevant policy change, in order to 
eliminate the effects of any temporary shifts in the timing of care.  Note that the dependent variable is 
multiplied by 10,000.  
 
42 
Table 5: Effects of 2002 Copayment Increases on Medical Payments Per Member Per Month 
By Source of Payment 
 
  2002 Policy Change 






































   Supplemental    








N  104  100  104   
** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. 
Each cell shows the coefficient from a separate difference-in-difference regression; standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  The dependent variable is indicated on the column heading; the payment source is 
indicated on the row label.  Regressions control for plan and month fixed effects.  They are estimated by 
GLS, allowing for plan-specific autocorrelation and plan-specific heteroskedasticity. All regressions exclude 
data from the 3 months before and after the relevant policy change, in order to exclude the effects of any 
temporary shifts in the timing of care.  There are 4 fewer observations used for the drug payment regressions, 
because months that were affected by timing shifts in drug purchases due to other policy changes were 
excluded.  Specifically, the regressions exclude February 2001, due to unusually large, one-time decreases in 
drug purchases in the PPOs resulting from the February 2001 policy change.  
  Column 4 shows the increase in hospital payments as a percentage of the decrease in office visit and 




Table 6: Heterogeneity in Effects of 2002 Copayment Increases  
on Payments per Member per Month, by Type of Plan Member 
  2002 HMO Policy Change  2002 Offset Effects 























































18.4  41.2  5.3 












































































20.1  54.6  3.9 




































36.5  117.6  4.9 






177.7  652.4  21.2  
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Chronic condition             









43.1  122.4  6.4 





































































69.6  764.8  10.0 






-10.7  -33.1  -1.2 
N  104  100  104       
** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. 
Each cell in Columns 1-3 shows the coefficient from a separate difference-in-difference regression; standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  The dependent variable is indicated on the column heading; the sub-
sample is indicated on the row label.  Regressions control for plan and month fixed effects.  They are 
estimated by GLS, allowing for plan-specific autocorrelation and plan-specific heteroskedasticity.  All 
regressions exclude data from the 3 months before and after the relevant policy change, in order to eliminate 
the effects of any temporary shifts in the timing of care. There are 4 fewer observations used for the drug 
regressions, because we exclude February 2001, due to unusually large, one-time decreases drug purchases 
in the PPOs resulting from the February 2001 policy change. 
  Column 4 shows the increase in total hospital payments as a percentage of the decrease in office visit 
and drug payments.  That is, it is equal to [-Column 3/ (Column 1 + Column 2)].  Columns 5 and 6 show the 
same calculations for payments by Medicare and by supplemental insurance plans.  Coefficients underlying 
the results in Columns 5 and 6 are available from the authors upon request.  
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Figure 2:  Effect of Drug Copayment Policy Changes on Drug Utilization 
 
Panel A: 2001 PPO Policy Change 
 
 
Panel B: 2002 HMO Policy Change 
 
 
The bars show the point estimates from Columns 3 and 7 of Table 3. 
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Figure 3: Effect of Policy Changes on Hospitalizations 
 
Panel A: 2001 PPO Policy Change 
 
 
Panel B: 2002 HMO Policy Change 
 
The bars show the point estimates from Column 2 and 5 of Table 4.  
 Note that all values in this figure and in Table 4 are multiplied by 10,000. 